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Revitalizing Indirect Purchaser Claims:
Antitrust Enforcement Under New York
Law
Robert F. Roach*
[The decade of the 1980s was marked by substantial changes in
the nature of antitrust enforcement. The decade had been
ushered in by the United States Supreme Court's decision in Il-
linois Brick v. Illinois, which held that only persons who dealt
directly with those who violated federal antitrust law were af-
forded a damage remedy under the Clayton Act. Indirect pur-
chasers, who purchased down the distribution chain, were de-
nied a remedy, even where monopoly overcharges were passed
on to them. Illinois Brick resulted in a significant decline in fed-
eral antitrust damages litigation. The 1980s also saw a decline in
antitrust enforcement activity by federal agencies. State legisla-
* Assistant Attorney General, Section Chief, Antitrust Bureau, New York Attorney
General's Office. The opinions expressed in this article are the author's own and do not
necessarily reflect the opinions of the New York Attorney General's Office. The article
benefitted greatly from the comments of Jane Azia, Timothy Cone, Antonia Hill, Wil-
liam Lanning, Lisa Napolitano and George Sampson.
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tures and attorneys general moved to fill the void in federal law
and law enforcement and provided an alternative avenue of
needed relief. In this article, through an analysis of New York
statutes, legislative history and case law, the author argues that
New York antitrust and consumer protection laws provide an ef-
fective remedy for indirect purchasers who are harmed by an-
ticompetitive activities but who are barred from seeking relief
under federal law].
I. Introduction
In recent years, new or revised state antitrust statutes,1 ac-
tive state attorneys general' and supportive United States Su-
preme Court decisionss have created a renaissance in the en-
forcement and development of state antitrust laws. State
antitrust laws now provide renewed avenues of relief for persons
who have been injured by anticompetitive business practices,
but who have been denied protection by restrictive interpreta-
tions of the federal antitrust laws or by inaction of federal agen-
cies charged with enforcing them.'
1. Since 1970, twelve states have adopted new antitrust laws: ALASKA STAT. §
45.50.562-596 (1986 & Supp. 1992); COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-4 (1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 35-
24-45 (1987 & Supp. 1992); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2101-14 (Supp. 1992); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 365.020-365.070 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1987); MD. CODE ANN. COM. LAW II
§ 11-201-213 (1990); NEV. REV. STAT. § 598A.010-280 (1991); N.J. REV. STAT. § 56:9-1 to
56:9-19 (1989); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 646.705-646.836 (1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-36 (1992);
VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-9.1 to 59.1-9.17 (Michie 1992); W.VA. CODE § 47-18-1 to 47-18-23
(1992). The only states lacking a general antitrust statute are Georgia, Pennsylvania,
Vermont and Wyoming.
2. In addition to individual state action, the states' attorneys general coordinate ac-
tivities through the National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG). NATIONAL Ass'N
OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, THE OFFICE OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL: POWERS & DUTIES 233-37
(Lynne M. Ross ed., 1990). NAAG's standing Antitrust Committee is comprised of seven
attorneys general. NATIONAL ASS'N OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT i-ii (1989). NAAG's Antitrust Task Force is comprised of the
chief antitrust attorney for each of the state attorneys general. Id. The Task Force coor-
dinates multistate antitrust investigations, litigation and amicus curiae briefs. Id. The
Task Force also develops proposed legislation, legislative commentary and policy posi-
tions for the Antitrust Committee and NAAG as a whole. Id.
3. See, e.g., California v. American Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271 (1990) (state authority
to seek divestiture as a form of injunctive relief under the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16
(1988), upheld as a remedy for violations involving anticompetitive mergers); California
v. ARC America Corp., 490 U.S. 93 (1989) (holding that state statutes which allow dam-
age remedies for indirect purchasers are not preempted by federal antitrust law).
4. See, e.g., Lloyd Constantine, Antitrust Federalism, 29 WASHBURN L.J. 163 (1990);
Symposium, Current Trends In State Antitrust Enforcement, 56 ANTITRUST L.J. 99
[Vol. 13:9
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In particular, states have actively sought to protect the
rights of so called "indirect purchasers." 5 Indirect purchasers do
not deal directly with price fixers or others who engage in an-
ticompetitive activity, but are injured when the costs of illegal
activities are passed down the distribution chain.6 As a result of
the United States Supreme Court decision in Illinois Brick Co.
v. Illinois,7 indirect purchasers are barred from collecting dam-
ages under the federal Clayton Act.8
Many state antitrust statutes rectify the inequity caused by
Illinois Brick by allowing damage remedies for indirect purchas-
ers.' Initially, some courts and commentators claimed that I11i-
(1987); Stanley M. Lipnick & Janis M. Gibbs, An Overview Of The Last Decade Of
State Antitrust Law, 16 U. TOL. L. REV. 929 (1985).
5. See infra note 9 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 116-26 and accompanying text.
7. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
8. Id. at 744-48. Section 4 of the Clayton Act, a federal law dealing with antitrust
regulations and unfair trade practices, provides a damage remedy for persons injured by
violations of federal antitrust laws. Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1988). It states in
pertinent part:
[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of any-
thing forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the
United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an
agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold
the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attor-
ney's fee.
Id. § 15(a).
9. In the wake of Illinois Brick, twelve states and the District of Columbia passed
statutes expressly providing for recovery by indirect purchasers. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§ 16750(a) (West Supp. 1989); D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-4509(a) (1981); HAWAII REV. STAT. §
480-14(c) (Supp. 1991); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 60-7(2) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-801(b) (Supp. 1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1104(1) (West
Supp. 1991); MD. CODE ANN. COM. LAW II § 11-209 (1990); MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. §
445.778 (West Supp. 1989); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325 D. 57 (West Supp. 1992); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 57-1-3(A) (Michie 1987); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-36-12(g) (1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 37-1-33 (1992); Wis. STAT. ANN, § 133.18(1) (West 1989). While these amendments
may have created new remedies in some states, California made clear that its amend-
ment simply codified an existing remedy under California law. 1978 Cal. Stat. 1696. The
California statute enacting the amendment declared that it "does not constitute a change
in, but is declaratory of, the existing law." Id. Other states, such as Arizona, did not
amend their statute after Illinois Brick, but claim that an implied right of recovery for
indirect purchasers exists under state law. See California v. ARC America Corp., 490
U.S. 93, 98 n.3 (1989) ("[t]he Arizona statute, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1408(A) (1987),
generally follows the language of the Clayton Act, but it might be interpreted as a matter
of state law as authorizing indirect purchasers to recover.").
Two states enacted antitrust statutes prior to Illinois Brick which explicitly permit
indirect purchasers to collect damages. ALA. CODE § 6-5-60(a) (1975) (statute, enacted in
3
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nois Brick barred state as well as federal indirect purchaser
claims.10 However, the United States Supreme Court rejected
these arguments in California v. ARC America Corp.," holding
that indirect purchasers may seek damages for antitrust viola-
tions under appropriate state law."2
The revitalization of state antitrust enforcement and the
ARC America decision require plaintiffs and potential defend-
ants alike to recognize the rights of indirect purchasers under
state antitrust law. s This article sets forth and explains three
propositions concerning remedies available to injured indirect
purchasers under New York law. First, the general rule of dam-
ages allows a remedy to any person proximately harmed by un-
lawful conduct. Illinois Brick, which bars recovery by injured
indirect purchasers,' is an exception to this rule and should be
strictly limited to cases arising under section 4 of the Clayton
Act. This limiting construction is supported by ARC America
and related Supreme Court decisions regarding indirect
purchasers. 5
Second, New York's antitrust statute, the Donnelly Act,"6
allows indirect purchasers to recover damages.17 Although the
Donnelly Act does not state in explicit language that indirect
purchasers may collect damages, the legislative history of the
Donnelly Act, its proper statutory construction, and New York
State public policy require a damage remedy to be implied. s
1907, granting damage remedy to parties for "direct or indirect" injury); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 75-21-9 (1972) (statute, enacted in 1942, granting damage remedy to parties for
"direct or indirect" injury).
10. See, e.g., In re Cement and Concrete Antitrust Litigation, 817 F.2d 1435, 1447
(9th Cir. 1987) ("state law claims ... based on indirect purchases ... that do not fall
within any exception to the rule of Illinois Brick are preempted because they stand 'as
an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives' of federal anti-
trust law."), rev'd sub nom. California v. ARC America Corp., 490 U.S. 93 (1989); How-
ard B. Green, Note, State Indirect Purchaser Statutes, The Preemptive Power of Illi-
nois Brick, 62 B.U. L. REv. 1241 (1982).
11. 490 U.S. 93 (1989).
12. Id. at 100, 105-06.
13. See infra notes 45-51 and accompanying text.
14. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 744-48.
15. See infra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
16. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 340-347 (McKinney 1988).
17. See infra note 72 and accompanying text.




Third, New York's "Little FTC Act" 19 and the Attorney
General's parens patriae authority under both New York's "Lit-
tle FTC Act""0 and the New York Executive Law,s1 also provide
monetary relief to indirect purchasers.2
II. Indirect Purchaser Claims Under Federal Law: ARC
America Corp. and Its Predecessors
In a multi-level distribution chain, monopoly overcharges
are typically passed on by intermediaries to ultimate purchas-
ers.23 This economic fact raises two questions: (1) who is enti-
tled to recover damages from monopolists; and (2) how, if at all,
are damages to be apportioned among purchasers at various
levels in the distribution chain? These questions were addressed
by the United States Supreme Court in Hanover Shoe, Inc. v.
United Shoe Machinery Corp.,24 Illinois Brick v. Illinois25 and
California v. ARC America Corp.26
Hanover Shoe involved a treble-damages action brought
under section 4 of the Clayton Act against a manufacturer of
shoe machinery by one of its customers, a manufacturer of
shoes.27 The shoe machinery manufacturer argued in its defense
that the plaintiffs business had not been injured as required by
section 4 because it had passed on the claimed illegal overcharge
to its customers who were the persons actually injured by the
antitrust violation.2 8
The Supreme Court rejected this defense, holding that a di-
rect purchaser suing for treble damages under section 4 of the
Clayton Act is injured within the meaning of the section by the
full amount of the overcharge it paid, and that the defendant is
not permitted to introduce evidence that indirect purchasers
19. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 349 to 350-e (McKinney 1988).
20. Id. § 349(b).
21. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 63(12) (McKinney 1992).
22. See infra notes 140-42 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 116-26 and accompanying text.
24. 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
25. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
26. 490 U.S. 93 (1990).
27. Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 483-84.
28. Id. at 487-88.
1993]
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were in fact injured by the illegal overcharge.2 9
The Court gave two reasons for the decision: first, proving
"pass on" of antitrust overcharges would be overly complicated;
and second, antitrust violators would retain the "fruits of their
illegality" because indirect purchasers "would have only a tiny
stake in the lawsuit" and, hence, little incentive to sue.30While Hanover Shoe barred "defensive pass-on,""1 the vast
majority of federal courts nevertheless continued to permit "of-
fensive pass-on" after Hanover Shoe.3 2 That is, indirect purchas-
ers were permitted by federal courts to recover damages from
monopolists by claiming that the excessive costs associated with
monopoly profits were passed on to them by wholesalers and
other middlemen.33 However, in Illinois Brick v. Illinois,"' the
29. Id. at 494.
30. Id. at 492-94.
31. Id. at 494.
32. See, e.g., In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191, 200 (9th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974); West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079,
1088 (2d Cir. 1971); Armco Steel Corp. v. Adams County, 376 F.2d 212, 214 (8th Cir.
1967); Armco Steel Corp. v. North Dakota, 376 F.2d 206, 210-11 (8th Cir. 1967); Lefrak
v. Arabian American Oil Co., 405 F. Supp. 597, 598 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); Carnwale Bag v.
Slide Rite Mfg. Corp., 395 F. Supp. 287, 291 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Midway Enter., Inc. v.
Petroleum Mktg. Corp., 375 F. Supp. 1339, 1347 (D. Md. 1974); In re Master Key Litiga-
tion, 1973 Trade Cas. (CCH) 74,680 (D. Conn. 1973); Boshes v. General Motors Corp.,
59 F.R.D. 589, 597 (N.D. Ill. 1973). Many actions by indirect purchasers have also been
permitted to proceed by courts without discussion. See, e.g., South Carolina Council of
Milk Producers, Inc. v. Newton, 360 F.2d 414 (4th Cir 1966); Bray v. Safeway Stores,
Inc., 392 F. Supp. 851 (N.D. Cal. 1975); In re Gypsum Cases, 386 F. Supp. 959 (M.D. Cal.
1974); Southern General Builders, Inc. v. Maule Indus., Inc., 1973-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
74,484 (S.D. Fla. 1973); In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 55 F.R.D. 269 (D.D.C.
1972); California v. Frito Lay, Inc., 333 F. Supp. 977 (C.D. Cal. 1971); Utah v. American
Pipe & Constr. Co., 316 F. Supp. 837 (C.D. Cal. 1969); "East of the Rockies" Concrete
Pipe Litigation, 302 F. Supp. 214 (J.P.M.L. 1969); Iowa v. Union Asphalt & Roadoils,
Inc., 281 F. Supp. 391 (S.D. Iowa 1968).
The only circuit court decision arguably to the contrary was Mangano v. American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 438 F.2d 1187 (3d Cir. 1971) (per curiam). This one
page decision upheld the district court's dismissal as a sanction for failure to answer
interrogatories. Id. Plaintiffs did not show how overcharges became part of their
purchase price. Id. The Third Circuit cited this as the "insuperable difficulty" discussed
in Hanover Shoe. Id. at 1188. Nevertheless, the principle announced in Mangano was
criticized and strictly limited to its facts by district courts in the Third Circuit. See, e.g.,
In re Sugar Antitrust Litigation, 73 F.R.D. 322, 350-55 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (allowing dam-
ages to indirect purchasers); Midway Enter., Inc. v. Petroleum Mktg. Corp., 375 F. Supp.
1339, 1344-45 (D. Md. 1974) (allowing damages to indirect purchasers).
33. See supra note 32.
34. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol13/iss1/2
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United States Supreme Court overruled the lower court
consensus.
3 5
In Illinois Brick, the State of Illinois brought suit on its
own behalf and on behalf of a number of local governmental
agencies seeking treble damages under section 4 of the Clayton
Act for a conspiracy to fix the price of concrete block in viola-
tion of section 1 of the Sherman Act. 6 The state and local gov-
ernments were all indirect purchasers of concrete block.3 7 They
did not purchase concrete block directly from the price-fixing
defendants, but absorbed the higher costs of concrete block
passed on to them by contractors performing construction
projects for state agencies.38
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, consistent with the
uniform interpretation of the lower courts, held that the state of
Illinois may well have been injured in fact as an indirect pur-
chaser.3 9 According to the circuit court, any difficulty the state
might have had in proving injury should not have prevented it
from pursuing its treble damage claims under the Clayton Act."'
The Seventh Circuit concluded that privity was not a require-
ment for recovery under the Clayton Act, and that allowing use
of "offensive pass-on" by plaintiffs, while denying "defensive
pass-on" under Hanover Shoe, was consistent with the purposes
of the Clayton Act.41
On review, the Supreme Court agreed that indirect purchas-
ers can be injured in fact, and may well have standing to sue
under section 4 of the Clayton Act.42 However, the Supreme
Court still chose to deny a damage remedy under section 4 of
35. Id. at 748.
36. Id. at 726-27.
37. Id. at 726.
38. Id.
39. Illinois Brick v. Ampress Brick Co., 536 F.2d 1163, 1165-67 (7th Cir. 1976).
40. Id. at 1166-67.
41. Id. at 1165-67.
42. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 728 n.7, 746. The Court explained that, "in elevating
direct purchasers to a preferred position as private attorneys general, the Hanover Shoe
rule denies recovery to those indirect purchasers who may have been actually injured by
antitrust violations." Id. at 746. Accordingly, subsequent to the Illinois Brick decision,
lower courts have permitted indirect purchasers to sue for injunctive relief. See, e.g., In
re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation, 600 F.2d 1148, 1167 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 905 (1980); Mid-West Paper Prod. Co. v. Continental Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 573,




the Clayton Act to "indirect purchasers who may have been ac-
tually injured by antitrust violations ' 4 3 for three reasons: (1) to
avoid multiple liability of defendants; (2) to provide plaintiffs
with incentive to sue; and (3) to avoid unnecessarily complicated
litigation.44
In California v. ARC America Corp.,45 a unanimous Su-
preme Court decided to strictly limit its decision in Illinois
Brick to claims under section 4 of the Clayton Act.4 6 In ARC
America, Alabama, Arizona, California and Minnesota sued vari-
ous defendants for fixing prices of cement."7 Along with their
claims under section 1 of the Sherman Act and section 4 of the
Clayton Act, plaintiffs sued under their state antitrust laws for
damages sustained by them as indirect purchasers of cement."8
At the outset, the Court stated that the issue in both Hano-
ver Shoe and Illinois Brick "was strictly a question of statutory
interpretation - what was proper construction of § 4 of the
Clayton Act."'49 To the extent that the Court discerned policy
reasons to deny recovery under section 4 of the Clayton Act to
indirect purchasers,. such policy was irrelevant to state antitrust
laws.50 The Court held:
It is one thing to consider the congressional policies identified in
Illinois Brick and Hanover Shoe in defining what sort of recovery
federal antitrust law authorizes; it is something altogether differ-
ent, and in our view inappropriate, to consider them as defining
what federal law allows States to do under their own antitrust
law.... [N]othing in Illinois Brick suggests that it would be con-
trary to congressional purposes for States to allow indirect pur-
43. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 731-36, 744-47.
44. Id. The majority in Illinois Brick stated that this conclusion better serves the
legislative purpose of the Clayton Act. Id. at 746. However, as the dissent clearly estab-
lishes, the legislative history supports a contrary conclusion. See id. at 733-34 n.14, 754-
58, 761-62, 764-65 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
45. 490 U.S. 93 (1990).
46. Id. at 105.
47. Id. at 97.
48. Id. at 98. Alabama's antitrust statute had allowed indirect purchasers an ex-
plicit damage remedy since 1907. See supra note 9. California and Minnesota amended
their statutes after Illinois Brick to allow an indirect purchaser remedy. See supra note
9. Arizona argued that an indirect purchaser remedy was implied in its state statute. See
supra note 9.





chasers to recover under their own antitrust laws."
Moreover, the Court went on to hold that allowing indirect
purchasers to collect damages under state antitrust laws, even
when brought as pendent claims in federal court, would not nec-
essarily complicate federal proceedings, would not deter plain-
tiffs from bringing antitrust claims, and would not result in mul-
tiple liability for defendants.2
The conclusion that must be *drawn from the above deci-
sions is clear. Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick are applicable
only to cases under section 4 of the Clayton Act and are irrele-
vant to any other statutes, including state antitrust laws. 53
51. Id.
52. Id. at 103-04.
53. Other Supreme Court decisions confirm this conclusion, since the principles and
reasoning of Illinois Brick have not been applied, even in other areas of federal antitrust
law. See Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642 (1969); Texaco, Inc. v. Hasbrouck, 496
U.S. 543 (1990). For example, one fundamental reason the Supreme Court decided that
injured indirect purchasers should be denied a damage remedy under section 4 of the
Clayton Act was that proof of cost pass-on from one level of the product distribution
chain to the next would be overly complex. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying
text. However, pass-on issues are not considered overly complex under section 2(e) of the
Robinson-Patman Act (codified as 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970)). The Robinson-Patman Act
deals with price discrimination where "a person engaged in commerce ... discriminate[s]
in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality ... where
the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or ... create
a monopoly . . . or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person .... " 15
U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970). The Act does not prevent price "differentials which make only due
allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from the
differing methods or quantities in which such commodities are to such purchasers sold or
delivered ...." Id.
In Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642 (1969), a Robinson-Patman action, the
Supreme Court held that a jury could award damages to a retail service station operator
who sued because the defendant had granted an illegal discount to a distributor who
passed on the discount to a competitor, thereby permitting the competitor to undersell
the plaintiff. Id. at 648-49. The Court required only a casual connection between the
discount and plaintiff's injury be shown. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the Court stated
that any limitation of recovery to a particular level in the chain of distribution would be
"wholly an artificial one." Id. at 647. According to the Court, any other result would be
unconscionable, permitting violators "to avoid the sanctions of the Act by the simple
expedient of adding an additional link to the distribution chain." Id.
The principles of Perkins were reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Texaco, Inc. v.
Hasbrouck, 496 U.S. 543 (1990). In that case, Texaco was found liable for damages
caused to Hasbrouck by an illegal discount which was passed on to Hasbrouck's competi-
tors. Id. at 570. Stating that the fact pattern was essentially the same as in Perkins, the
Supreme Court held that "[t]he additional link in the distribution chain does not insu-
late Texaco from liability .... " Id. at 566. Indeed, in addressing the issue of damages,
1993]
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III. Remedies For Indirect Purchasers Under New York
Antitrust Law
While the Donnelly Act was modeled, in part, after the fed-
eral Sherman Act,54 interpretations of the Donnelly Act do not
follow federal law where differences in statutory language, legis-
lative history or state policy occur.5 Therefore, in order to de-
termine whether indirect purchasers may recover damages for
violation of New York's antitrust law, New York courts must re-
fer to the Donnelly Act, its legislative history and case law. As
discussed below, New York case law and proper statutory con-
struction of the Donnelly Act permit indirect purchasers to col-
lect damages for antitrust violations. 6 This conclusion is rein-
forced by New York State policy considerations.5
A. Common Law Principles
The Sherman Act, a federal antitrust law prohibiting unrea-
sonable interference with free market pricing and distribution in
interstate trade,5 8 was passed on July 2, 1890."9 Activities pro-
hibited by the Sherman Act were set forth in section 1.60 As
originally passed, section 7 of the Sherman Act provided a dam-
age remedy for persons injured by violations of section 1.61 Sec-
the Supreme Court reaffirmed their "traditional rule," excusing antitrust plaintiffs from
an unduly rigorous standard of proving antitrust injury. Id. at 572. According to the
Court, plaintiffs need not submit "concrete, detailed proof of injury," thus solving the
overly complex problem of proving pass-on. Id. at 573 (citing J. Truett Payne Co. v.
Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557, 565-66 (1981)).
Likewise, tracing passed-on costs was not considered "too complicated" by the Su-
preme Court under federal tax law. Anniston Mfg. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 337 (1937). In
Anniston Mfg. Co., the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a requirement
that tax refund claimants prove that they did not pass on increased costs. Id. at 347-56.
54. See infra notes 58-72 and accompanying text.
55. Anheuser-Busch v. Abrams, 71 N.Y.2d 327, 334-35, 520 N.E.2d 535, 539, 525
N.Y.S.2d 816, 820 (1988). See also People v. Roth, 52 N.Y.2d 440, 447, 420 N.E.2d 929,
930, 438 N.Y.S.2d 737, 738 (1981) ("[a] Federal Court interpreting a Federal statute [the
Sherman Act] has no direct bearing upon a State court's analysis of an analogous provi-
sion enacted by the State Legislature [the Donnelly Act].").
56. See infra note 72.
57. See infra notes 100-37 and accompanying text.
58. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988).
59. Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209-10 (1890) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7
(1988)).
60. 15 U.S.C. § 1.
61. Id. § 7.
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol13/iss1/2
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tion 7 of the Sherman Act was repealed in 1955,62 and was su-
perseded by section 4 of the Clayton Act.68
New York's antitrust statute, the Donnelly Act,6 ' was origi-
nally enacted in 189765 in response to a decision by the United
States Supreme Court66 severely limiting the scope of the Sher-
man Act. 7 The Donnelly Act was modeled in part after the
Sherman Act.6 8 While the New York Legislature adopted lan-
guage regarding prohibited activities similar to section 1 of the
Sherman Act, it did not adopt the damage provisions of section
7 of the Sherman Act. 9 Nor did the Legislature adopt the lan-
guage of section 4 of the Clayton Act when it was enacted in
1914.70 Indeed, no reference to damages was made in the Don-
nelly Act until 1957 when a statute of limitations was added.7 1 It
was not until 1975 that an explicit damage remedy was provided
62. Act of July 7, 1955, ch. 283, §§ 3, 7, 69 Stat. 283.
63. Act of October 15, 1914, ch. 323, §§ 4, 15, 38 Stat. 731 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 15
(1988)).
64. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 340-347 (McKinney 1988).
65. Act of May 7, 1897, ch. 383, 1897 N.Y. Laws 310 (codified as amended at N.Y.
GEN. Bus. LAW § 340(1) (McKinney 1988)). It provided:
Section 1. Every contract, agreement, arrangement or combination whereby a mo-
nopoly in the manufacture, production or sale of any article or commodity of com-
mon use is or may be created, established or maintained, or whereby competition
in this state in the supply or price of any such article or commodity is or may be
restrained or prevented, or whereby for the purpose of creating, establishing or
maintaining a monopoly within this state of the manufacture, production or sale
of any such article or commodity, the free pursuit in this state of any lawful busi-
ness, trade or occupation is or may be restricted or prevented, is hereby declared
to be against public policy, illegal and void.
Id.
66. United States v. E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. 1, 17 (1894) (holding that manufacturing
was not commerce).
67. See REP. OF THE JOINT COMM. OF THE NEW YORK STATE SENATE AND ASSEMBLY,
APPOINTED TO INVESTIGATE TRUSTS 28-30 (1897); REP. OF THE SPECIAL COMM. TO STUDY
THE NEW YORK STATE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE NEW YORK STATE BAR Ass'N 9a-10a
(1957).
68. New York v. Mobil Oil Corp., 38 N.Y.2d 460, 463, 344 N.E.2d 357, 359, 381
N.Y.S.2d 426, 428 (1976).
69. Act of May 7, 1897, ch. 383, 1897 N.Y. Laws 310 (codified as amended at N.Y.
GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 340-347 (McKinney 1988)).
70. Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 731 (1914) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1988)).
71. Act of Apr. 24, 1957, ch. 893, 1957 N.Y. Laws 1931 (codified at N.Y. GEN. Bus.
LAW § 340(5) (McKinney 1988)). The new section provided: "An action to recover dam-
ages caused by a violation of this section must be commenced within four years after the
cause of action has accrued." Id.
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in the Act.72
While the Donnelly Act as originally passed did not ex-
pressly provide for damages to those injured by its violation,
New York courts applied common law principles 3 and implied a
right to damages under the Donnelly Act, 74 including punitive
damages to provide relief for plaintiffs. 75 Under common law
principles, there is no limitation barring indirect purchasers
from collecting damages under the Donnelly Act.76 Recoverable
damages under the Donnelly Act are those damages "proxi-
mately caused by the violation. 77 Proximate cause only requires
a plaintiff to be "within the reasonable foreseeable area to be
affected by the antitrust violations, 7 and does not require priv-
ity of contract.
To the contrary, there is a strong policy under New York
72. Act of July 1, 1975, ch. 333, 1975 N.Y. Laws 498 (codified at N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW
§ 340(5) (McKinney 1988)). It provides in part: "The state, or any political subdivision
or public authority of the state, or any person who shall sustain damages by reason of
any violation of this section, shall recover three-fold the actual damages sustained
thereby, as well as costs not exceeding ten thousand dollars, and reasonable attorneys'
fees." Id.
73. The Donnelly Act was based on and did not alter common law. In re Davies, 168
N.Y. 89, 101, 61 N.E. 118, 120 (1901). See REP. OF THE SPECIAL COMM. TO STUDY THE NEW
YORK STATE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE NEW YORK STATE BAR Ass'N (1957). New York
common law, predating the Donnelly Act, gives the injured party fair compensation for
the wrong which has been done him. United States Trust Co. of N.Y. v. O'Brien, 143
N.Y. 284, 287-88, 38 N.E. 266, 267 (1894). Where there is an alleged violation of a New
York statute, an action is maintainable by any person injured thereby, so long as the
person injured is one of the class designed to be protected by the statute. Pauley v.
Steam Gauge & Lantern Co., 131 N.Y. 90, 95-96, 29 N.E. 999, 1000 (1892).
74. See Straus v. American Publishers Ass'n, 231 U.S. 222, 230 (1913). See also Al-
exander's Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Ohrbach's, Inc., 266 A.D. 535, 539-40, 42 N.Y.S.2d 703,
707-08 (1st Dep't 1943); Dunkel v. McDonald, 57 N.Y.S.2d 211, 212 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1945),
aff'd, 270 A.D. 757, 59 N.Y.S.2d 921 (1st Dep't 1946).
75. See Ambruester v. Anglo-South American Trust Co., 260 A.D. 598, 599, 23
N.Y.S.2d 458, 459 (1st Dep't 1940).
76. Indeed, one New York court held that in fashioning damage remedies, New York
courts will follow common law principles and federal antitrust cases such as Hanover
Shoe are irrelevant. Orange & Rockland Utilities, Inc. v. New England Petroleum Corp.,
60 A.D.2d 233, 236-37, 400 N.Y.S.2d 79, 82 (1st Dep't 1977).
77. Mobil Corp. v. Rubenfeld, 48 A.D.2d 428, 433, 370 N.Y.S.2d 943, 948 (2d Dep't
1975), aff'd, 40 N.Y.2d 936, 358 N.E.2d 882, 390 N.Y.S.2d 57 (1976).
78. Lerner Stores Corp. v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 86 Misc. 2d 215, 218, 381 N.Y.S.2d
968, 970 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (citing Mulvey v. Samuel Goldwyn Prods., 433 F.2d 1073 (9th




common law against requiring privity of contract as a prerequi-
site for recovering damages for wrongful conduct.7 9 In fact, New
York has led the country in removing privity of contract as a
prerequisite for recovering damages for wrongful conduct.80 New
York courts have apparently never required privity of contract
as a prerequisite to recovery of damages by those injured by vio-
lations of the Donnelly Act.81 For example, in Straus v. Ameri-
can Publishers Ass'n,82 a book retailer was boycotted by book
wholesalers and publishers because it discounted the selling
price of books.83 Although there was no privity of contract,
Straus collected damages from the Association because the Asso-
ciation's violation of the Donnelly Act injured Straus.8 4
In Peekskill Theatre v. Advance Theatrical Co. of New
York, Peekskill Theatre was the victim of an illegal boycott in-
stigated by a competitor, Loew's, Inc.85 The court found Peek-
skill Theatre was injured by Loew's violation of the Donnelly
Act, entered an injunction, and stated that Peekskill Theatre
was entitled to damages, although there was no privity of con-
tract between them. 6 Thus, New York case law supports the
award of damages to any person whose injuries were proximately
caused by violations of the Donnelly Act, including indirect
purchasers.8 7
79. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382 (1916). Since the decision of
MacPherson in 1916, privity as a prerequisite for recovery has been consistently rejected
by New York courts. See Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5,
12-16, 181 N.E.2d 399, 402-04, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363, 367-70 (1962) (finding that where a
defendant engages in false advertising and false promises, no privity of contract is re-
quired); Inman v. Binghampton Hous. Auth., 3 N.Y.2d 137, 144-45, 143 N.E.2d 895, 898-
99, 164 N.Y.S.2d 699, 703-04 (1957) (finding that lack of privity will not bar a plaintiff
from holding architects or builders liable for their handiwork).
80. See supra note 79.
81. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 340 (McKinney 1988).
82. 231 U.S. 222 (1913).
83. Id. at 229.
84. Id. at 230.
85. 206 A.D. 138, 139, 200 N.Y.S. 726, 727 (1st Dep't 1923).
86. Id. at 140, 142-43, 200 N.Y.S. at 728, 730.
87. The only case to the contrary is Russo & Dubin v. Allied Maintenance, 95 Misc.
.2d 344, 407 N.Y.S.2d 617 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978). The court in Russo did not attempt to
analyze the Donnelly Act, its case law, legislative history or purposes. Rather, the court
simply relied on the United States Supreme Court decision in Illinois Brick, and dis-
missed the indirect purchaser claims. Id. at 349, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 621. Russo is incorrect
because it ignores significant decisions of the New York Court of Appeals. See, e.g.,
1993]
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B. Legislative Intent
When the Legislature amended the Donnelly Act in 1975 to
add treble damage provisions similar to section 4 of the Clayton
Act,88 it intended to maintain a damage remedy for indirect pur-
chasers, as was permitted by state and federal law at the time. 9
The legislature's intent in enacting a New York statute is inter-
preted "not from the time ... when courts are called on to inter-
pret it, but as of the time [the statute] took effect." 90 Where a
statute subject to interpretation was first enacted in another
state or by the federal government, and was then adopted by the
legislature in New York, the construction which was placed on
the act by the other jurisdiction at the time the statute was en-
acted is thought to have been within the minds and intent of the
legislature and adopted with the statute.91
As noted above, when the Donnelly Act was enacted there
was no explicit reference to damages, and a common law remedy
of damages was adopted by the New York courts.2 It was not
until 1975 that the Donnelly Act was amended to reflect treble
damage provisions similar to section 4 of the Clayton Act. 3
Anheuser-Busch v. Abrams, 71 N.Y.2d 327, 334-35, 520 N.E.2d 535, 539, 525 N.Y.S.2d
816, 820 (1988) (interpretations of the Donnelly Act should not follow federal law where
differences in state policy, statutory language, or legislative history occur); People v.
Roth, 52 N.Y.2d 440, 447, 420 N.E.2d 929, 930, 438 N.Y.S.2d 737, 738 (1981) ("a [flederal
[c]ourt interpreting a [flederal statute [the Sherman Act] has no direct bearing upon a
[s]tate court's analysis of an analogous provision enacted by the [sitate [lI]egislature
[Donnelly Act]."). Moreover, the decision is no longer valid after ARC America because
of its simple reliance on Illinois Brick as binding on New York courts without an inde-
pendent analysis of the Donnelly Act. See California v. ARC America, 490 U.S. 93, 103
(1989).
88. See infra note 93 and accompanying text.
89. See supra notes 72-87.
90. N.Y. STAT. LAW § 93 (McKinney 1971). See also Kelley v. Yannotti, 4 N.Y.2d
603, 606, 152 N.E.2d 69, 71, 176 N.Y.S.2d 637, 640 (1958); Spencer v. Bd. of Educ. of
Schenectady, 39 A.D.2d 399, 402, 334 N.Y.S.2d 783, 786 (3d Dep't), aff'd, 31 N.Y.2d 810,
291 N.E.2d 585, 389 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1972).
91. N.Y. STAT. LAW § 262 (McKinney 1971). See Coane v. American Distilling Co.,
182 Misc. 926, 931-32, 49 N.Y.S.2d 838, 844 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1944).
92. See supra note 73.
93. Act of July 1, 1975, ch. 333, 1975 McKinney's Sess. Law News 498 (codified at
N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 340(5), 341 (McKinney 1988)). See Memorandum from the Attor-
ney General, Louis J. Lefkowitz, to the Governor (June 20, 1975) (contained in Bill
Jacket to Act of July 1, 1975, ch. 333, 1975 McKinney's Sess. Law News 498) [hereinafter
Memorandum from the Attorney General].
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INDIRECT PURCHASER CLAIMS
When the New York legislature adopted language similar to
the Clayton Act in 1975,9" "it adopted terminology that came
with a history of interpretation" 95 which, under principles of
statutory construction, was in the minds of the legislature. In
1975, the law under the Clayton Act, as articulated by the Sec-
ond Circuit and by the vast majority of federal courts, permitted
indirect purchasers a damage remedy.9 6 Indeed, one study exam-
ining antitrust cases filed after 1960, but before Illinois Brick,
found indirect purchasers were plaintiffs in almost two-thirds of
all federal antitrust actions and were the only plaintiffs in
twenty five percent of all cases.9I When the legislature amended the Donnelly Act in 1975, in-
direct purchasers in New York were unquestionably permitted
under New York and federal law to collect damages for antitrust
violations.9 8 Nothing in the legislative history of the Donnelly
Act or the case law remotely suggests that the New York legisla-
ture, in amending the Donnelly Act, intended to remove an ex-
isting indirect damage remedy from the Act, as was done later to
the Clayton Act by the Supreme Court in Illinois Brick.9 Ac-
cordingly, the legislature could only have intended to increase
the damage remedies available.
C. Public Policy Considerations
As noted above, requiring privity of contract as a prerequi-
site for recovering damages for wrongful conduct is contrary to
New York's public policy.10 Moreover, an indirect purchaser
remedy under the Donnelly Act is supported by New York's
public policy which favors: (1) damage remedies that encourage
vigorous enforcement of the Donnelly Act; (2) damage remedies
rationally based in antitrust economics; and (3) the fair appor-
tionment of damages provided by an indirect purchaser damage
94. See Lerner Stores Corp. v. Parklane Hosiery Corp., 86 Misc. 2d 215, 217, 381
N.Y.S.2d 968, 969 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976).
95. Id.
96. See supra note 32.
97. S. REP. No. 239, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1979).
98. See supra notes 72-87 and accompanying text.
99. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 728-29 (1977).




remedy. 1 ' Moreover, indirect purchaser actions will not be
overly complex for New York courts. 102
1. Ensuring Vigorous Prosecutions
According to the New York Court of Appeals, the Donnelly
Act reflects a "strong public policy in favor of free competition
for New York" and represents "a public policy of the first mag-
nitude."103 The New York legislature has consistently reinforced
this strong public policy through amendments to the Donnelly
Act aimed at invigorating public and private enforcement of the
Act.104 For example, the Donnelly Act was amended in 1921 and
in 1933 to expand its coverage to include restraints in transpor-
tation, marketing and services, as well as interferences with the
"free exercise of any activity.' 0 5
In 1957, a committee was appointed to study the Donnelly
Act and recommend improvements. 0 6 The committee's investi-
gation resulted in two pieces of legislation: one expanding the
scope and coverage of the Donnelly Act, 07 and the other increas-
ing funding for antitrust enforcement by the Attorney Gen-
eral.108 According to Governor Harriman, the "[clommittee gave
exhaustive consideration to the whole subject of State antitrust
laws before formulating its recommendations . . . [and con-
cluded] that there is a real need for the enforcement of our State
antitrust legislation.' ' 0 9 The Governor concurred, stating that
"[tihe need for vigorous enforcement of the antitrust laws was
101. See infra Part III.C.1-3.
102. See infra Part III.C.4.
103. Columbia Gas v. New York State Electric & Gas, 28 N.Y.2d 117, 127, 268
N.E.2d 790, 796, 320 N.Y.S.2d 57, 65 (1971) (quoting In re Aimcee Wholesale Corp., 21
N.Y.2d 621, 237 N.E.2d 223, 289 N.Y.S.2d 968 (1968)).
104. See infra notes 105-15 and accompanying text.
105. Act of May 13, 1921, ch. 712, 1921 N.Y. Laws 2501 (codified at N.Y. GEN. Bus.
LAW § 341(1) (McKinney 1988)); Act of Aug. 26, 1933, ch. 804, 1933 N.Y. Laws 1635,
1636 (codified at N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 341 (McKinney 1988)).
106. See REP. OF THE SPECIAL COMM. TO STUDY THE NEW YORK STATE ANTITRUST
LAWS OF THE NEW YORK STATE BAR ASS'N (1957).
107. Act of Apr. 24, 1957, ch. 893, 1957 N.Y. Laws 1931 (codified at N.Y. GEN. Bus.
LAW § 340(5) (McKinney 1988)).
108. Act of Apr. 24, 1957, ch. 895, 1957 N.Y. Laws 1934. See Governor's Memoranda
on Bills Approved, reprinted in 1957 N.Y. Legis. Ann. 522.




underlined in my annual messages of the last two years." 110 The
1957 amendments to the Donnelly Act, according to the Gover-
nor, were designed to accommodate this need, expand the Act
and invigorate enforcement."' Since 1957, the legislature has
continued to expand the Donnelly Act, increase damages and
penalties, and invigorate enforcement.1
This clear public policy favoring strong public and private
enforcement of the Donnelly Act requires that indirect purchas-
ers retain their right to sue for damages because direct purchas-
ers cannot be relied upon to enforce antitrust laws. 13 Among
110. Id. at 523.
111. Id.
112. For example, in 1961, the Attorney General was given the power to seek civil
penalties for antitrust violations. Act of Apr. 22, 1961, ch. 749, 1961 N.Y. Laws 2088
(codified as amended at N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 342-a (McKinney 1988)). In 1963, the
Attorney General was given power to cite a recalcitrant witness for civil contempt in
Donnelly Act investigations. Act of Apr. 16, 1963, ch. 333, 1963 N.Y. Laws 1677 (codified
as amended at N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 343 (McKinney 1988)). In 1969, the need for cor-
roboration of the testimony of accomplices in antitrust prosecutions was eliminated. Act
of May 26, 1969, ch. 1059, 1969 N.Y. Laws 2674 (codified as amended at N.Y. GEN. Bus.
LAW § 347 (McKinney 1988)). Also in 1969, the Attorney General was given power under
the Donnelly Act to bring suit and receive damages on behalf of state political subdivi-
sions and public authorities. Act of May 21, 1969, ch. 635, 1969 N.Y. Laws 1804 (codified
as amended at N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 342(b) (McKinney 1988)). In 1975, criminal penal-
ties were increased, making the violation of the Donnelly Act a felony and making pri-
vate treble damages in such actions available. Act of July 1, 1975, ch. 333, 1975 McKin-
ney's Sess. Law News 498 (codified at N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 340(5), 341 (McKinney
1988)). In 1979 and 1980, the Attorney General's investigative and enforcement powers
were enhanced by allowing out-of-state subpoena service and tolling the statute of limi-
tations during federal antitrust proceedings. Act of July 10, 1979, ch. 589, 1979 N.Y.
Laws 1 (codified at N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 343 (McKinney 1988)); Act of May 6, 1980, ch.
107, 1980 N.Y. Laws 1056 (codified at N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §342(c) (McKinney 1988)).
113. See, e.g., In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191, 198 (9th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974); Boshes v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589, 598
(N.D. Ill. 1973). In Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481
(1968), the Supreme Court denied a pass-on defense because it was concerned, under the
facts of that case, that indirect purchasers might not have sufficient incentive to sue. Id.
at 494. In Illinois Brick v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 725 (1977), the Court minimized the signifi-
cance of this rationale by referring to it as being secondary in importance. Id. at 732
n.12. In California v. ARC America Corp., 490 U.S. 93 (1990), consisteht with the cases
and commentators, the Court seems to have completely abandoned this rationale. The
Court stated:
In one respect, the Court of Appeals was overly narrow in its description of the
congressional purposes identified in Illinois Brick, the court was concerned not
merely that direct purchasers have sufficient incentive to bring suit under the an-
titrust laws, as the Court of Appeals asserted, but rather that at least some party




other constraints, direct purchasers may be dependent on their
suppliers and thus fearful of retaliation, while others may be un-
willing to jeopardize longstanding profitable relationships. " 4 In
addition, because direct purchasers typically pass on antitrust
overcharges to indirect purchasers, they will generally be unwill-
ing to sue, and if they do sue, they may settle for less."' Thus,
the vigorous enforcement of the Act demanded by the legislature
requires that indirect purchasers maintain their right to sue for
damages.
2. Basing Remedies on Economics and Experience
A second public policy reason for allowing indirect purchas-
ers to sue for damages is that such a remedy is rationally and
substantially based on antitrust economics and experience. It
has long been recognized that an anticompetitive overcharge
may be substantially, if not completely, passed on by in-
termediaries to ultimate purchasers. " 6 Courts have also ob-
served that middlemen can both pass on an anticompetitive
overcharge and increase their profits." 7
These observations of courts and commentators are based
on fundamental economic theory." 8 Middlemen will pass on an
anticompetitive overcharge to indirect purchasers at a rate de-
termined by the elasticity of supply and demand." 9
Elasticity represents the relationship between price and the
quantity either demanded or sold. 20 In the context of determin-
Id. at 102.
114. Malcolm E. Wheeler, Antitrust Treble Damage Actions: Do They Work?, 61
CAL. L. REv. 1319, 1331-32 & nn.56-57 (1973); Comment, Antitrust Enforcement By Pri-
vate Parties: Analysis of Developments in the Treble Damage Suit, 61 YALE L.J. 1010,
1057 & nn.309-10 (1952). See also Panel Discussion: Private Actions-The Purposes
Sought and the Results Achieved, 43 ANTTRUST L.J. 73, 87-95 (1973).
115. Elmer J. Schaeffer, Passing-On Theory In Antitrust Treble Damage Actions,
16 WM. & MARY. L. REv. 883, 914-15 n.122 (1975).
116. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 746; In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d at
191. See also Robert G. Harris & Lawrence A. Sullivan, Passing on the Monopoly Over-
charge; A Comprehensive Policy Analysis, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 269, 276 (1979); Schaeffer,
supra note 115, at 920-25.
117. West Virginia v. Chas. Phizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079, 1084 (2d Cir. 1971).
118. Harris & Sullivan, supra note 116, at 275-76.
119. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 741.
120. PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, EcONOMIcs 379-386 (12th ed.




ing the rate at which a direct purchaser-middleman passes on an
anticompetitive overcharge, pass on will be total when demand
is inelastic or supply elastic.12" ' Products which have been the
subject of price-fixing are typically in markets characterized by
inelastic demand. 2 2 Conversely, supply is likely to be relatively
elastic. 23
In other words, because a rational price fixing conspiracy
"raises the price above the noncollusive level, there must not be
a relatively larger drop in sales volume; higher prices must mean
higher total revenue. "124 The end result is that "in a multiple-
level chain of distribution, passing on monopoly overcharges is
not the exception: it is the rule.' 25
Thus, indirect purchasers will bear the brunt of a price fix-
ing conspiracy in most cases. Because the Donnelly Act allows
damages to "any person who shall sustain damages by reason of
any violation of this section,' 26 indirect purchasers must be af-
forded a damage remedy.
3. Apportioning Damages Fairly
In addition to the policy reasons in favor of an indirect pur-
chaser damage remedy, it must be noted that such a remedy will
create little risk of multiple liability for defendants. 12 7 Rather,
the remedy will allow for a fair apportionment of damages
1, 19-22 (1975).
121. Harris & Sullivan, supra note 116, at 283-87; Schaeffer, supra note 115, at 887-
97.
122. Walter B. Erickson, Economics of Price Fixing, 2 ANTrrRUST L. & ECON. REv.
83, 86-87 (1969); Richard A. Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested
Approach, 21 STAN. L. REv. 1562, 1569-75, 1603-04 (1969); George A. Hay & Daniel Kel-
ley, An Empirical Survey of Price Fixing Conspiracies, 17 J.L. & EcON. 13, 25 n.16
(1974).
123. See generally Harris & Sullivan, supra note 116, at 283-87, 318-19.
124. John M. Kuhlman, Nature and Significance of Price Fixing Rings, 2 ANTI-
TRUST L. & ECON. REV. 69, 72-75 (1969).
125. Harris & Sullivan, supra note 116, at 276, 335 (general contractors treat input
costs as direct costs and pass them on in full in the overwhelming majority of cases);
Schaeffer, supra note 115, at 897-900, 920-56 (increased cost of vital component passed
on in full).
126. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 340(5) (McKinney 1988).
127. As a practical matter, the asserted danger of multiple liability is more hypo-
thetical than real. See, e.g., Crown Oil Corp. v. Superior Court, 223 Cal. Rptr. 164, 169,
appeal dismissed sub nom. Crown Oil Corp. v. Lapidus Popcorn, Inc., 479 U.S. 879





There are three reasons for this conclusion. First, as noted
above, the majority, if not all, of the anticompetitive overcharge
will be passed on to indirect purchasers. 1 8 Second, recovery
under New York state law is determined by actual injury. 129
This rule has been applied as well by those states allowing indi-
rect purchasers damages in antitrust cases.130 Third, when the
threat of double recovery occurs, courts will fashion relief to
avoid such a result. 131
4. Over-Complexity Not A Problem
Indirect purchasers should not be denied a remedy based on
the allegation that such cases will be overly complex. Commen-
tators agree that the economic analysis required to determine
the scope of an indirect purchaser's injuries is straightforward
and is no more difficult than the usual effort to determine dam-
ages in antitrust cases. 32 Moreover, it must be noted that, under
New York law, a plaintiff need not prove damages with cer-
tainty.' Finally, many states allow such antitrust actions'34 and
numerous federal courts have successfully entertained actions
for damages by indirect purchasers in the past.' Indeed, the
Supreme Court now agrees that indirect purchaser cases need
not be too complex for federal courts to adjudicate, because
state indirect purchaser damages will be determined by federal
128. See supra text accompanying notes 116-26.
129. Steitz v. Gifford, 280 N.Y. 15, 19 N.E.2d 661 (1939). See also 36 N.Y. JUR. 2D
Damages § 9 ("[t]he plaintiff cannot hold the defendant liable for more than the actual
loss which the defendant has inflicted by his wrong .... ").
130. A determination of the extent of antitrust injuries actually sustained is essen-
tial to indirect purchaser's California claim. Union Carbide, 679 P.2d at 19. See also D.C.
CODE ANN. § 28-4509(b) (1981 & Supp. 1991); HAW. REV. STAT. § 480-13 (c)(2) (Supp.
1988); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 60-7(2) (Smith-Hurd 1977 & Supp. 1992); MD. CODE
ANN. COM. LAW II § 11-209(b)(2)(ii) (1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325D.57 (West 1981 &
Supp. 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-1-3(c) (Michie 1978); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-36-12(g)
(1956 & Supp. 1990).
131. See, e.g., Crown Oil Corp., 223 Cal. Rptr. at 169.
132. Harris & Sullivan, supra note 116, at 320-21, 337; Schaeffer, supra note 115, at
915-16.
133. See Duane Jones Co. v. Burke, 306 N.Y. 172, 192, 117 N.E.2d 237, 247-48
(1954). Accord, Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, 395 U.S. 100, 124-25 (1969).
134. See supra note 9.




courts in adjudicating pendent state law claims. 3 6 It cannot be
concluded, particularly in light of the strong public policy in
favor of such actions, that New York State courts are less capa-
ble of handling indirect purchaser cases. 137
IV. Monetary Relief For Indirect Purchasers Under New
York's "Little FTC Act" And The New York Executive Law
Fundamental honesty and fair dealing in our free market
economy plainly require sellers to price and sell products and
services independently, and not to collusively inflate prices or
restrict supply. Some collusive business practices which are ille-
gal under the Donnelly Act, such as price fixing"3 8 and customer
allocation,13 9 violate these concepts of fundamental honesty and
fair dealing.
New York's "Little FTC Act"140 and the New York Execu-
tive Law141 forbid fraudulent and deceptive practices, and allow
monetary relief to all persons injured by such practices, includ-
ing indirect purchasers. " Thus, indirect purchasers who are in-
jured by practices which violate concepts of fundamental hon-
esty, such as price fixing and customer allocation, will have
separate and distinct claims for fraud and deception, in addition
to Donnelly Act claims.
A. Defining Fraudulent And Deceptive Business Practices
Section 63(12) of the New York Executive Law is designed
to prevent fraud or illegal business conduct.1 43 The statute de-
136. See California v. ARC America Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 103-04 (1989).
137. Indeed, indirect purchasers have an explicit right to collect damages through
New York courts under New York's "Little FTC" Act, N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 349(b)
(McKinney 1988). See infra text accompanying notes 138-217.
138. E.g., American Dental Cooperative, Inc. v. Abrams, 127 A.D.2d 274, 276-77, 514
N.Y.S.2d 228, 230 (1st Dep't 1987); People v. Wisch, 58 Misc. 2d 766, 768, 296 N.Y.S.2d
882, 885 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969). See also People v. Schwartz, 160 A.D.2d 964, 965, 554
N.Y.S.2d 686, 687 (2d Dep't 1990).
139. E.g., People v. Rattenni, 79 A.D.2d 691, 578 N.Y.S.2d 257, 258-59 (2d Dep't
1992), appeal granted, 79 N.Y.2d 1053, 596 N.E.2d 418, 584 N.Y.S.2d 1020 (1992).
140. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 349(b) (McKinney 1988).
141. N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 63(12) (McKinney 1992).
142. Id; N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 349(b) (McKinney 1988).
143. Section 63(12) was first enacted in 1956. Act of Apr. 14, 1956, ch. 592, 1956
N.Y. Laws 1336 (codified as amended at N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 63(12) (McKinney 1982 &
19931
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fines "fraud" or "fraudulent" as "any device, scheme or artifice
to defraud and any deception, misrepresentation, concealment,
suppression, false pretense, false promise or unconscionable con-
tractual provisions.""'
New York General Business Law ("G.B.L.") Article 22-A,
which is entitled "Consumer Protection From Deceptive Acts
and Practices," is based on section 5 of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act,1 " and provides in pertinent part: "Deceptive acts
Supp. 1993)). As originally drafted, section 63(12) was limited to the activities of part-
nerships and unincorporated companies that conducted business under an assumed
name. Id. However, the statute was broadened in 1959 to cover all fraudulent and illegal
business activities, regardless of the form of the business entity. Act of Apr. 8, 1959, ch.
242, 1959 N.Y. Laws 999 (codified as amended at N.Y. EXEc. LAW § 63(12) (McKinney
1982 & Supp. 1993)).
144. N.Y. EXEc. LAW § 63(12) (McKinney 1992). Under the terms of the statute, the
New York Attorney General may seek relief when the fraud or illegal conduct is "re-
peated". Id. The term "repeated" is defined by the statute to include conduct affecting
more than one person or repetitions of any separate and distinct fraudulent or illegal act.
Id.
Section 63(12) also protects against repeated "illegal" acts. Id. Repeated violations
of any federal, state or local law or regulation constitutes an "illegality" within the
meaning of section 63(12). Id. See, e.g., State v. Ford Motor Co., 136 A.D.2d 154, 158,
aff'd, 74 N.Y.2d 495, 548 N.E.2d 906, 549 N.Y.S.2d 368 (1989) (involving state law); State
v. Princess Prestige Co., 42 N.Y.2d 104, 106, 366 N.E.2d 61, 63, 397 N.Y.S.2d 360, 361
(1977) (involving state law); Lefkowitz v. Scottish American Ass'n, 52 A.D.2d 528, 528,
381 N.Y.S.2d 671, 672 (1st Dep't 1976) (involving U.S. Civil Aeronautics Board regula-
tions); People v. Calogero Corp., 78 Misc. 2d 953, 957-58, 358 N.Y.S.2d 790, 793-94 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1974), aft'd, 47 A.D.2d 741, 365 N.Y.S.2d 548 (1st Dep't 1975) (involving an
antitrust violation and illegal tying arrangement, as well as Internal Revenue Service
regulations); People v. Ackerman, 24 Misc. 2d 83, 84, 202 N.Y.S.2d 352, 354 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1960) (involving New York City housing laws).
145. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1988). Therefore, General Business Law Article 22-A is given
parallel construction to section five of the Federal Trade Commission Act (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 45 (1988)). See, e.g., State v. Colorado State Christian College, 76 Misc. 2d 50,
53-54, 346 N.Y.S.2d 482, 486-87 (Sup. Ct. 1973); Metropolitan Retail Ass'n v. City of
New York, 60 Misc. 2d 805, 807-08, 303 N.Y.S.2d 612, 614-15 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969).
Originally, General Business Law Article 22-A prohibited only false advertising. N.Y.
GEN. Bus. LAW § 350 (McKinney 1988). This provision was derived from section 15 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 55(a)(1) (1988). See Governor's Memoran-
dum on Approval of 1963 N.Y. Laws 813, reprinted in 1963 N.Y. Legis. Ann. 465, 466;
Memorandum from the Attorney General, supra note 93, at 106. General Business Law
Article 22-A was amended when New York's Consumer Protection Act, General Business
Law section 349, was enacted in 1970 and added to General Business Law Article 22-A.
Act of March 3, 1970, ch. 43, 1970 N.Y. Laws 103 (codified at N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 349
(McKinney 1988)). Section 349 was based substantially on a proposed consumer protec-
tion statute drafted by the Antitrust Committee of the New York State Bar Association
(hereinafter "Bar Committee"). N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 349 (McKinney 1988). See REP. OF
THE COMM. ON NEW YORK STATE ANTITRUST LAW OF THE ANTITRUST LAW SECTION OF THE
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol13/iss1/2
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or practices in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce
or in the furnishing of any service in this state are hereby de-
clared unlawful. 1 46
New York courts give a parallel construction to Executive
Law section 63(12) and G.B.L. Article 22-A, 14 and, under both
statutes, define "fraud" much more broadly than common law
fraud.148 People v. Federated Radio Corp.,49 first set forth what
has become the standard statutory definition of "fraud":
In a broad sense the term [fraud] includes all deceitful practices
contrary to plain rules of common honesty. . . . [T]he words
"fraud" or "fraudulent" in this connection should, therefore, be
given a wide meaning so as to include all acts, although not
originating in any actual evil design or contrivance to perpetrate
fraud or injury upon others, which do by their tendency to
deceive or mislead the purchasing public come within the purpose
of the law. 180
NEw YORK STATE BAR ASS'N: A PROPOSED NEW STATE LAW MAKING DECEPTIVE AcTs OR
PRACTICES UNLAWFUL, 1968 N.Y. ST. B.A. ANTITRUST L. S mp. 114 (CCH ed.) [hereinafter
COMMITrEE REPORT]. The Committee Report arose from a 1967 study by the Bar Com-
mittee. See STUDY OF THE COMM. ON NEW YORK STATE ANTITRUST LAW OF THE ANTITRUST
LAW SECTION OF THE NEW YORK STATE BAR Ass'N, 1970 N.Y. ST. B.A. ANTITRUST L. SYMP.
72 (CCH ed.) [hereinafter COMMITTEE STUDY].
The Bar Committee reviewed General Business Law section 350 and other New
York State statutes which protected consumers and concluded that they were insuffi-
cient. COMMITTEE STUDY, supra, at 91-94. See also COMMrrrIE REPORT, supra, at 117.
According to the Bar Committee, existing state laws were complex, scattered, overlap-
ping and inconsistent. COMMTrEE STUDY, supra, at 93. The Bar Committee reviewed the
Federal Trade Commission Act, a model state act proposed by the Federal Trade Com-
mission and other state statutes prohibiting fraud and deception, and modeled its pro-
posed legislation, in large part, on these statutes. Id. at 94-106.
146. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 349(a) (McKinney 1988). New York General Business
Law Article 22-A also prohibits false advertising. Id. at § 350. See supra note 145.
147. State v. Colorado State Christian College, 76 Misc. 2d at 54, 346 N.Y.S.2d at
488 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973). Indeed, the New York Attorney General has always been per-
mitted to use Executive Law section 63(12) and General Business Law Article 22-A to-
gether. See, e.g., State v. Diamond Tours & Travel, Inc., N.Y. L.J. Jan. 7, 1977, at 11;
State v. Alan Business Management, Ltd., N.Y. L.J. Jan. 3, 1977, at 5; State v. Police
Benevolent Ass'n of the Dist. Attorney's Office of the City of N.Y., Inc., N.Y. L.J., Dec.
30, 1976, at 10.
148. See Lefkowitz v. Bull Inv. Group, 46 A.D.2d 25, 28, 360 N.Y.S.2d 488, 491 (3d
Dep't 1974); State v. Interstate Tractor Trailer Training, Inc., 66 Misc. 2d 678, 682, 321
N.Y.S.2d 147, 151 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1971); State v. Bevis Indus., Inc., 63 Misc. 2d 1088,
1090, 314 N.Y.S.2d 60, 64 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970).
149. 244 N.Y. 33, 154 N.E. 655 (1926).
150. Id. at 38-39, 154 N.E. at 658. Federated Radio Corp. was an action under the
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By broadly defining the nature of "fraud" and "deception,"
the courts avoid the need to detail every prohibited practice,
and make clear that Executive Law section 63(12) and G.B.L.
Article 22-A are not limited to acts which are described by ex-
press statute as fraudulent. 18 1
B. Collusive Business Practices: Price-Fixing and Customer
Allocation
Because of the broad proscription against fraud and decep-
tion, reported cases brought pursuant to Executive Law section
63(12) and G.B.L. Article 22-A involve a wide panoply of is-
sues,' including cases involving alleged violations of the Don-
Martin Act, New York's statute prohibiting securities fraud. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352
(McKinney 1988). The definition of "fraud" under the Martin Act, first articulated by
the court in Federated Radio Corp., was subsequently followed and widely quoted by
New York courts interpreting the meaning of "fraud" under New York Executive Law
Section 63(12). See, e.g., Bull Inv. Group, 46 A.D.2d at 28, 360 N.Y.S.2d at 491-92; Inter-
state Tractor Trailer Training, Inc., 66 Misc. 2d at 682, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 151; Bevis
Indus., Inc., 63 Misc. 2d at 1090, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 64.
Pursuant to this definition, New York courts consistently hold that scienter is im-
material to establishing fraud or deception. Bull Inv. Group, 46 A.D.2d at 28, 360
N.Y.S.2d at 491; Lefkowitz v. E.F.G. Baby Products, Inc., 40 A.D.2d 364, 367, 340
N.Y.S.2d 39, 42 (3d Dep't 1973); Colorado State Christian College, 76 Misc. 2d at 56,
346 N.Y.S.2d at 489; Bevis Indus., Inc., 63 Misc. 2d at 1090, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 64; accord,
Doherty v. F.T.C., 317 F.2d 669, 674 (2d Cir. 1963).
Additionally, an omission of a material fact, as well as affirmative misrepresenta-
tions, can be fraudulent and deceptive. Bull Inv. Group, 46 A.D.2d at 28, 360 N.Y.S.2d
at 492; State v. General Motors Corp., 120 Misc. 2d 371, 374, 466 N.Y.S.2d 124, 127
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983). See also F.T.C. v. Pharmtech Research, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 294
(D.D.C. 1983) (discussing section 5 of Federal Trade Commission Act). "Material" means
tending to affect consumers' purchasing decisions about a product or a service. American
Home Prod. Corp., 98 F.T.C. 136, 368 (1981), aff'd as mod., 695 F.2d 683, 684 (3d Cir.
1982) (discussing section 5 of Federal Trade Commission Act).
Finally, the law protects the credulous and unthinking as well as the cynical and
intelligent. Guggenheimer v. Ginzburg, 43 N.Y.2d 268, 273, 372 N.E.2d 17, 19, 401
N.Y.S.2d 182, 184 (1977); People v. Volkswagen of America, 47 A.D.2d 868, 868, 366
N.Y.S.2d 157, 158 (1st Dep't 1975); Colorado State Christian College, 76 Misc. 2d at 56,
346 N.Y.S.2d at 489.
151. Matter of Prudential Advertising, Inc. v. Attorney General, 22 A.D.2d 737, 737,
253 N.Y.S.2d 491, 492-93 (3d Dep't 1964). See supra notes 148-50 and accompanying
text. The drafters of section 349 of New York General Business Law Article 22-A argued
that existing statutes were insufficient to adequately deal with the many possible forms
of fraud and deception. CoMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 145, at 117. Indeed, the drafters
intended that section 349 would expand to counter new and varied forms of deceptive
conduct as they evolved. CoMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 145, at 121.
152. See, e.g., Richard A. Givens, SUPPLEMENTARY PRACTICE COMMENTARIES, 19 Mc-
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nelly Act.153 However, because a finding of fraud is not predi-
cated on the finding of a violation of the Donnelly Act or any
other law,'" collusive practices such as price-fixing and cus-
tomer allocation will be deceptive and fraudulent without refer-
ence to any other statute. This conclusion is supported by nu-
merous federal cases, which hold that bid rigging schemes
(which fix price and allocate customers) are fraudulent.1 55
As in state courts, federal courts give a broad interpretation
to the concept of statutory fraud. " A scheme to defraud, as
used in the federal mail 57 and wire fraud statutes, 5 ' includes
Kinney's Consolidated Laws of New York 83, 83-100 (Supp. 1989).
153. E.g., People v. Calogero Corp., 78 Misc. 2d 953, 957-58, 358 N.Y.S.2d 790, 794-
95 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974) (court enjoined an illegal tying arrangement, under Executive
Law section 63(12), where service stations tied the sale of gasoline during the "gas crisis"
to the purchase of auto repair services); People v. Asiatic Petroleum, N.Y. L.J. April 9,
1974, at 17 (court allowed the state of New York to proceed on a claim that a conspiracy
to restrict the supply of oil and to raise prices violated Executive Law § 63(12)). In
neither case, however, did the courts expressly reach the issue of whether such anticom-
petitive practices would be considered "fraudulent" or "deceptive."
At least one commentator has argued that any violation of New York law should be
considered per se deceptive under New York General Business Law Article 22-A because
the illegal activity contravenes New York public policy. See Joseph T. Moldovan, Note,
New York Creates A Private Right Of Action To Combat Consumer Fraud: Caveat
Venditor, 48 BROOK. L. Rav. 509, 559-62 (1982). The author's argument is persuasive.
New York General Business Law Article 22-A is given a parallel construction with Exec-
utive Law § 63(12). See supra note 147 and accompanying text. New York General Busi-
ness Law Article 22-A is also modeled after other state statutes forbidding fraud and
deception, including the State of Washington's Consumer Protection Statute, WASH. REv.
CODE ANN. § 19.86.020 (West 1989). See CoMMrrIrE STUDY, supra note 145, at 105.
Under both Executive Law section 63(12) and state court decisions, any act or practice
that violated a law specifically designed to protect the public was inimical to the public
interest and therefore automatically considered to be an unfair or deceptive act or prac-
tice. See, generally, Lefkowitz v. ITM, Inc., 52 Misc. 2d 39, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1966); State v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 501 P.2d 290, 301-02 (Wash. 1972). However,
there is some legislative history to the contrary. See infra note 171.
154. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
155. E.g. United States v. Dynalectric Co., 859 F.2d 1559, 1569-78 (11th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1006 (1989); United States v. Washita Constr. Co., 789 F.2d 809,
817-18 (10th Cir. 1986); United States v. Rodgers, 624 F.2d 1303, 1306-10 (5th Cir. 1980);
cert. denied sub nom. Anthony J. Bertucci Constr. Co. v. United States, 450 U.S. 917
(1981); United States v. Azzarelli Constr. Co., 612 F.2d 292, 298 (7th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 447 U.S. 920 (1980); United States v. Climatemp, Inc., 482 F. Supp. 376, 381
(N.D. Il. 1979), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Reliable Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 705
F.2d 461 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Fakter v. United States, 462 U.S. 1134 (1983).
156. United States v. Pearlstein, 576 F.2d 531, 534 (3d Cir. 1978).
157. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988).




any plan or course of action intended to deceive others in order
to obtain something of value from the persons to be deceived."'
Thus, federal mail and wire fraud statutes, as with Executive
Law section 63(12) and G.B.L. Article 22-A, are not limited to
frauds that violate other federal or state statutes.' 60
Since no violation of any other statute is required, federal
courts condemn as fraudulent any attempt to collusively set
prices or allocate contracts or customers, even though "at-
tempts" do not violate the Sherman Act."' The reasoning was
set forth in United States v. Critical Industries, Inc. 62 In Criti-
cal Industries, a federal wire fraud prosecution, defendants were
charged with attempting to secretly fix the price at which de-
fendants and their competitors would sell respirators and filters
used in the abatement of asbestos containing materials.' The
court, following an earlier decision of the Sixth Circuit in United
States v. Ames Sintering Co.,'" condemned the price fixing
scheme as fraudulent.'1 5 Initially, the court described the decep-
tive nature of the scheme:
Although the alleged attempt here was not to rig a bid to a spe-
cific business entity as in Ames, the indictment charges similar
fraudulent conduct, namely, an attempt to inflate prices for which
goods would be offered to customers generally - customers who
would be deceived into believing that the prices being quoted to
them were governed by market forces, not the secret agreement of
competitors. 166
The court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the indict-
159. United States v. McNally, 483 U.S. 350, 358-59 (1987); United States v. Gold-
blatt, 813 F.2d 619, 624 (3d Cir. 1987); Pearlstein, 576 F.2d at 535.
160. Moore v. United States, 865 F.2d 149 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Asher,
854 F.2d 1483 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1029 (1989). See also United States
v. Lindsey, 736 F.2d 433, 436 (7th Cir. 1984); United States v. Kleimer, 609 F.2d 126, 128
(5th Cir. 1980).
161. United States v. Ames Sintering Co., 927 F.2d 232, 236 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding
that a violation of the wirefraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1988), did not constitute a
violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988)); United States v. Critical Indus.,
Inc., Crim. No. 90-318 (D.N.J. Dec. 12, 1990) (Debevoise, J.).
162. Critical Indus., Crim. No. 90-318 (D.N.J. Dec. 12, 1990) (Debevoise, J.).
163. Id. at 30-31.
164. Id. at 32-33 (citing United States v. Ames Sintering Co., 927 F.2d 232 (2d Cir.
1990) (involving an attempted bid rigging)).
165. Id. at 34.





The conduct charged in this case is a scheme to defraud unwit-
ting customers by secretly fixing at inflated levels the prices
charged them. "Fundamental honesty, fair play and upright deal-
ing" in the business life in a free market economy require sellers
to price products independently and not to collusively inflate
such prices. Thus, to secretly fix prices at inflated levels, as
charged in the indictment, is to engage in fraud without regard to
the Sherman Act. Collusive bidding schemes constitute "schemes
or artifices to defraud" in violation of the mail and wire fraud
statutes."' 7
While the definition of criminal fraud under federal law dif-
fers somewhat from civil fraud standards under G.B.L. Article
22-A and Executive Law section 63(12),118 the reasoning set
forth by the federal courts under the mail and wire fraud stat-
utes is equally persuasive under New York law. As under federal
law, New York consumers are entitled to purchase goods and
services at prices resulting from fair and open competition. 169
When businesses circumvent the competitive process and fix
prices or allocate customers or contracts, then customers are
deceived. 70 Therefore, they are entitled to relief under G.B.L.
Article 22-A and Executive Law section 63(12)."
167. Id.
168. The concept of fraud is a broader, more flexible standard under G.B.L. Article
22-A and Executive Law § 63(12) than under federal mail and wire fraud statutes. The
federal statutes require proof of several elements which involve a scheme: (1) knowingly
or intentionally participated in by defendant; (2) consisting of misrepresentations or
omissions; (3) reasonably calculated to deceive persons of ordinary prudence and com-
prehension; (4) through use of mail or wire communication. E.g., Kehr Packages, Inc. v.
Fidel Corp., 926 F.2d 1406 (3d Cir. 1991); Pritchard v. United States, 386 F.2d 760 (8th
Cir. 1967), cert. denied sub nom. Borchett v. United States, 390 U.S. 1004 (1968). The
concept of fraud under New York statutes substantially eliminates a number of these
proof requirements. See supra note 150.
169. See supra notes 143-51 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 152-67 and accompanying text.
171. Arguably, not every agreement which is anticompetitive under the Donnelly
Act is fraudulent and deceptive. For example, an argument can be made that an open,
public merger which was anticompetitive and, therefore, illegal under the Donnelly Act,
see supra Part IV.A-B, would not be deceptive or fraudulent to consumers. Indeed, the
Bar Committee that proposed New York's consumer protection statute envisioned that it
would not encompass every violation of state and federal antitrust law. CoMMrrrEE RE-
PORT, supra note 145, at 127-28; COMMITrEE STUDy, supra note 145, at 106-10. While the




C. Remedies For Victims of Deceptive Business Practices
The New York Attorney General is authorized to enforce
G.B.L. Article 22-A"2' and Executive Law section 63(12),'17 while
a private right of action is created by G.B.L. Article 22-A. 17 4 The
exact remedies for violation of each statute differ and, therefore,
require separate discussion.
1. Role of New York Attorney General
Under section 349(b) of G.B.L. Article 22-A, the Attorney
General may investigate alleged violations of Article 22-A, 175
and, where appropriate, may seek injunctive relief and restitu-
tion.17 1 Under the explicit language of section 349(b), indirect
purchasers who are injured by fraudulent or deceptive practices
are entitled to monetary relief.177 The Article provides:
Whenever the attorney general shall believe from evidence satis-
factory to him that any person, firm, corporation or association or
agent or employee thereof has engaged in or is about to engage in
any acts or practices stated to be unlawful he may bring an action
in the name and on behalf of the people of the State of New York
to enjoin such unlawful acts or practices and to obtain restitution
of any moneys or property obtained directly or indirectly by any
sion Act, the Committee rejected some of it, including the Federal Trade Commission
Act phrase "unfair methods of competition," in its proposed statute. COMMITTEE REPORT,
supra note 145, at 127-28; CoMMrrTEE STUDY, supra note 145, at 106-10. The Bar Com-
mittee noted that the Donnelly Act and federal antitrust law differed in a variety of
respects. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 145, at 127-28; COMMITTEE STUDY, supra note
145, at 106-10. The Bar Committee did not wish to adopt federal antitrust law wholesale
into the proposed legislation, which, in effect, would repeal the differences embodied in
Donnelly Act case law. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 145, at 127-28; COMMITTEE STUDY,
supra note 145, at 106-10. Moreover, the Bar Committee was concerned that the term
"unfair methods of competition" encompassed antitrust concepts that were far outside
the scope of the fraud and deception to which their proposed legislation was directed.
COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 145, at 127-28; COMMITTEE STUDY, supra note 145, at
106-10. However, it does not appear necessary to establish that every violation of the
Donnelly Act is fraudulent. Clearly, collusive agreements, such as price fixing and cus-
tomer allocation, have no redeeming social values and will always be fraudulent and
deceptive.
172. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 349(b) (McKinney 1988).
173. See infra text accompanying notes 197-205.
174. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 349(h) (McKinney 1988).
175. Id. § 349(f).





such unlawful acts or practices.1 7 8
Where statutory language is clear and unambiguous, courts
must follow the legislature's mandate. 1 9 Each word must be
given its appropriate meaning.180 The New York Attorney Gen-
eral is given explicit authority to seek restitution of any money
or property obtained directly or indirectly by fraud or deceit.,
Therefore, there can be no question that the legislature intended
that indirect purchasers have a remedy for deception or fraud. 8 2
This legislative directive is consistent with the public policy
announced by the New York Court of Appeals in Randy Knit-
wear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co.183 In Randy Knitwear, a
garment manufacturer purchased fabric treated by a resin man-
ufactured by American Cyanamid. 8 4  American advertised
through trade journals, direct mail and garment tags that fabric
treated with its resin would not shrink or stretch. 8 5 Randy
Knitwear purchased fabric treated with the resin, but the fabric
shrunk and stretched when subjected to ordinary washing.8 6 Al-
though Randy Knitwear did not purchase directly from Ameri-
can Cyanamid, they sued for breach of express warranty.8 7 The
Court of Appeals reversed a 39 year old precedent, and held that
privity of contract was not necessary. 88 The Court reasoned that
public policy and present-day commercial practices required
that manufacturers be held responsible for damages caused to
178. Id. (Emphasis added).
179. Washington Post Co. v. New York State Ins. Dep't, 61 N.Y.2d 557, 565, 463
N.E.2d 604, 606, 475 N.Y.S.2d 263, 265 (1984); Eaton v. New York City Conciliation &
Appeals Board, 56 N.Y.2d 340, 345, 437 N.E.2d 1115, 1117, 452 N.Y.S.2d 358, 360 (1982).
See generally N.Y. STAT. LAW § 76 (McKinney 1971).
180. Drelich v. Kenlyn Homes, Inc., 86 A.D.2d 648, 649, 446 N.Y.S.2d 408, 410 (2d
Dep't 1982).
181. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 349(b) (McKinney 1988).
182. Cf. ALA. CODE § 6-5-60(a) (1975) (which grants a damage remedy to parties for
"direct or indirect" injury). The United States Supreme Court, in California v. ARC
America Corp., 490 U.S. 93 (1990), held that, in general, state statutes can permit indi-
rect purchasers a damage remedy. See supra notes 45-53 and accompanying text.
183. 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d 399, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962).
184. Id. at 9, 181 N.E.2d at 400, 226 N.Y.S.2d at 364.
185. Id. at 10, 181 N.E.2d at 400, 226 N.Y.S.2d at 365.
186. Id. at 9, 181 N.E.2d at 400, 226 N.Y.S.2d at 364.
187. Id. at 8-11, 181 N.E.2d at 400-01, 226 N.Y.S.2d at 364-66.




indirect purchasers by false advertising. 189 The Court stated that
"[the policy of protecting the public from injury, physical or
pecuniary, resulting from misrepresentations outweighs alle-
giance to an old and out-moded technical rule of law .... "1 0
Following Randy Knitwear, one New York court has held
that imposing a privity requirement in cases under G.B.L. Arti-
cle 22-A was inappropriate. 9 ' Likewise, courts of other states
with similar consumer protection statutes have reached the same
conclusion.'
Moreover, G.B.L. Article 22-A provides that "[t]his section
shall apply to all deceptive acts or practices declared to be un-
lawful, whether or not subject to any other laws of this state...
" 9 Thus, even if we assume arguendo that injured indirect
purchasers may not recover damages under state antitrust law
because of Illinois Brick, and, therefore, are "not subject to any
other laws of this state," they will still be permitted to recover
restitution under G.B.L. Article 22-A.
While the New York Attorney General may collect restitu-
tion for indirect purchasers under G.B.L. Article 22-A, unlike
the Donnelly Act, there is no provision in Article 22-A for recov-
ery of treble damages by the Attorney General.' 9 ' However, Arti-
cle 22-A does provide for a civil penalty of up to five hundred
dollars for each violation, which accrues to the state and may be
recovered by the New York Attorney General.19 5 While this pen-
alty may seem small at first glance, the total penalty that a court
may impose against an offender may be very substantial, be-
cause each victim, each improper act, each false statement or
189. Id. at 12-13, 181 N.E.2d at 401-02, 226 N.Y.S.2d at 367-68.
190. Id. at 13, 181 N.E.2d at 402, 226 N.Y.S.2d at 368.
191. Hyde v. General Motors Corp., N.Y. L.J., October 30, 1981, at 5 (Sup. Ct.)
(court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss a class action, under General Business
Law Article 22-A, on the ground of lack of privity (citing Randy Knitwear v. American
Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d 399, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962))). See also State v.
General Motors Corp., 120 Misc. 2d 371, 466 N.Y.S.2d 124 (Sup. Ct. 1983) (finding that
privity was not necessary under New York Executive Law Section 63(12)).
192. See, e.g., Barthlow v. Metcalf, 594 S.W.2d 143, 144 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
193. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW. § 349(g) (McKinney 1988).
194. But see infra text accompanying notes 206-12 (allowing individual plaintiffs
bringing private actions to be awarded treble damages up to $1000 at the discretion of
the court where the wrongdoing is willful or knowing). See also N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §
340(5) (McKinney 1988) (treble damages permitted).
195. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 350-c (McKinney 1988).
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deceptive omission constitutes a separate violation of Article 22-
A, 1 9 6
The New York Attorney General may also seek injunctive
relief, restitution and damages19 for repeated fraud or illegality
under Executive Law section 63(12) alone1 98 or in conjunction
with G.B.L. Article 22-A. 199
Moreover, New York Courts consistently permit injured
consumers to obtain monetary relief under section 63(12) with-
out requiring privity. 00 In State v. Ford Motor Co.,2°0 the New
York Attorney General brought a proceeding under section
63(12) alleging that the automobile manufacturer was charging a
$100 deductible to new car owners against the cost of warranty
repairs in violation of New York's New Car Lemon Law. 02 The
Court of Appeals awarded restitution even though the New Car
196. While this issue has not been decided by New York courts, the conclusion is
supported by federal and state courts interpreting analogous provisions of the Federal
Trade Commission Act and state statutes forbidding fraudulent and deceptive practices.
See, e.g., United States v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 662 F.2d 955, 966 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 908 (1982); State v. United Energy Corp. of America, 725 P.2d 752, 755-
58 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986); Commonwealth v. Flick, 382 A.2d 762, 765 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1978); Commonwealth v. Toleson, 321 A.2d 701, 712 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1974); State v.
Ralph Williams Northwest Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 553 P.2d 423, 436 (Wash. 1976).
.197. N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 63(12) (McKinney 1988). Section 63(12) was amended in
1977 to allow the Attorney General to collect damages as well as restitution. Act of Aug.
1, 1977, ch. 539, 1977 N.Y. Laws 1 (codified as amended at N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 63(12)
(McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1993)). The power to obtain restitution and damages is in-
tended "in appropriate cases, to award statutory or compensatory damages." Memoran-
dum to the Governor from the Attorney General, reprinted in 1977 N.Y. Legis. Ann. 194.
This power to direct restitution under section 63(12) is broadly construed and has
been defined to embrace the authority to order respondents to take whatever affirmative
action is necessary to achieve full restitution. See, e.g., New York v. Princess Prestige, 42
N.Y.2d 104, 366 N.E.2d 61, 397 N.Y.S.2d 360 (1977) (court ordered respondents to notify
consumers of their statutory right to cancel their contracts for housewares and electronic
equipment); New York v. Bevis Indus., Inc., 63 Misc. 2d 1088, 1092, 314 N.Y.S.2d 60, 66
(Sup. Ct. 1970) (court ordered a fund to be established for restitution). Pursuant to sec-
tion 63(12), courts customarily order restitution to all defrauded consumers, even where
the consumers are not all identified at the time of the order. See, e.g., Princess Prestige,
42 N.Y.2d at 108, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 362; New York v. Scottish-American Association, 52
A.D.2d 528, 528-29, 366 N.E.2d 63, 381 N.Y.S.2d 671, 672 (1st Dep't 1976); Bevis Indus-
tries, 63 Misc. 2d. at 1092, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 66.
198. See supra note 144.
199. See supra note 147.
200. See infra text accompanying notes 201-05.
201. 74 N.Y.2d 495, 548 N.E.2d 906, 549 N.Y.S.2d 368 (1989).
202. Id. at 499, 548 N.E.2d at 908, 549 N.Y.S.2d at 370.
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Lemon Law did not provide for such relief and the consumers
lacked privity with Ford.20 3 Likewise, in State v. General Motors
Corp.,204 the Court permitted the New York Attorney General to
seek restitution on behalf of consumers under section 63(12)
against General Motors for fraud, even though consumers lacked
privity with the manufacturer.
0 5
2. Private Right Of Action
G.B.L. Article 22-A did not originally provide for private
enforcement, but was amended in 1980 to allow for a private
right of action. 20 6 The amendment, which added G.B.L. section
349(h), provides that "any person who has been injured 2 0 7 by a
violation of the Article may sue for injunctive relief and dam-
ages, and the prevailing plaintiff may recover attorney's fees.208
The court may award actual damages or a minimum statutory
damage of fifty dollars, whichever is greater.0 9 Where the de-
fendant willfully or knowingly violates G.B.L. Article 22-A, the
court may treble plaintiff's damages up to one thousand dol-
lars.210 Plaintiffs may pursue their claims under Article 22-A as a
class action, 211 although one court has held that the class is lim-
ited to seeking only actual damages and may not seek treble or
minimum statutory damages.2"'
G.B.L. section 349(h) differs from section 349(b) and does
not explicitly state that indirect purchasers may pursue a pri-
vate right of action.2 1s However, New York courts have refused
to impose a privity requirement under section 349(h).214 More-
203. Id. at 499, 548 N.E.2d at 908, 549 N.Y.S.2d at 372.
204. 120 Misc. 2d 371, 466 N.Y.S.2d 124 (Sup. Ct. 1983).
205. Id. at 373-75, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 126-27.
206. Act of June 19, 1980, ch. 346, 1980 N.Y. Laws 1303 (codified at N.Y. GEN. Bus.
LAW § 349(h) (McKinney 1988)).




211. Weinburg v. Hertz Corp., 69 N.Y.2d 979, 981-82, 509 N.E.2d 347, 348, 516
N.Y.S.2d 652, 653 (1987); Burns v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 118 Misc. 2d 289, 292,
460 N.Y.S.2d 410, 413 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982), aff'd, 97 A.D.2d 977, 468 N.Y.S.2d 1017,
appeal dismissed, 61 N.Y.2d 604, 462 N.E.2d 155, 473 N.Y.S.2d 1025 (1984).
212. Burns, 118 Misc. 2d at 292-93, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 413.
213. See supra notes 174-82, 207-12 and accompanying text.




over, because any person who has been injured may sue for dam-
ages, 15 and because any Sherman Act or Donnelly Act limita-
tions resulting from Illinois Brick do not apply,21 6 an indirect
purchaser proximately harmed by a violation of Article 22-A
should be permitted a private right of action.2 17
V. Conclusion
Federal law and law enforcement are no longer the sole
source of relief for victims of antitrust offenses. State law will
often provide a remedy that federal law does not.2 18 In New
York, indirect purchasers should look to state law for relief. The
legislative history, case law and public policy behind the Don-
nelly Act, G.B.L. Article 22-A and Executive Law section 63(12)
establish that indirect purchasers injured by anticompetitive or
fraudulent conduct are entitled to monetary relief.
215. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 349(h) (McKinney 1988).
216. See supra notes 53, 193 and accompanying text.
217. See supra Part IV.
218. See supra notes 1-9 and accompanying text.
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